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Why Didn’t Canada’s Housing Market Go Bust?
James MacGee
Housing markets in the United States and Canada are similar in many respects, but each has fared quite differently since 
the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. A comparison of the two markets suggests that relaxed lending standards likely played 
a critical role in the U.S. housing bust.
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Despite their many points of similarity, housing markets 
in the United States and Canada have fared quite differ-
ently since the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. Unlike the U.S., 
Canada has not experienced a dramatic increase in mort-
gage defaults, nor has any Canadian bank required a gov-
ernment bailout. As a result, observers such as The Economist 
have pointed to Canada as “a country that got things right.”
The different housing market outcomes in Canada and the 
U.S. can tell us something about the underlying causes of 
the housing boom and subsequent bust. In particular, they 
can be used to evaluate the roles that low interest rates and 
relaxed lending standards played in the boom and bust. 
Some observers blame monetary policy for lowering interest 
rates over 2002–2005, pushing up housing demand, increas-
ing residential investment, and raising housing prices. In 
this view, the monetary-policy-induced housing boom thus 
set the stage for an inevitable housing bust. 
Others contend that relaxed lending standards, highlighted 
by the rise in subprime lending, played a critical role. This 
loosening of standards led to an increase in housing de-
mand, as mortgages were issued to households that were 
likely to have trouble making the mortgage payments. This 
extension of credit to risky borrowers helped fuel a housing 
boom and set the stage for the resulting surge in defaults, 
which were a big factor in the housing “bust.” 
The Canada and U.S. housing market comparison sug-
gests that relaxed lending standards likely played a critical 
role in the U.S. housing bust. Monetary policy was very 
similar in both countries from 2000 to 2008, but housing 
prices rose much faster in the U.S. than in Canada. This 
suggests that some other factor both drove the more rapid 
appreciation in U.S. prices and set the stage for the housing 
bust. A likely candidate is cross-country differences in the 
structure and regulation of subprime lending markets. That 
mortgage delinquencies began to climb before the recession 
in the U.S. but only began to rise recently in Canada (after 
the economic slowdown began), points to the signiﬁ  cance of 
those structural and regulatory differences in explaining the 
U.S. housing crash. 
Canadian and U.S. Housing Market Trends
Canada and the U.S. experienced signiﬁ  cant increases in 
house prices and residential investment from 2000 to 2006, 
though prices in Canada appreciated more slowly. Figure 1 
plots the S&P Case-Shiller 20 city composite index and the 
(Canadian) Teranet–National Bank 6 city composite index. 
Both series are based on repeat sales, making these series a 
closer approximation to a “constant-quality” price index of 
nominal home prices than average house price sales. The 
Case-Shiller and Teranet series indicate that over 2000–2006, 
U.S. prices appreciated nearly twice as much as Canadian 
houses. However, Canadian house prices continued to 
appreciate until late 2008, and are now nearly 80 percent 
higher than in 2000. 
The counterpart to rapid house price appreciation has been 
an increase in the ratio of mortgage debt to disposable 
income. While the comparison is complicated by different 
deﬁ  nitions of the household sector and debt categories in the 
Flow of Funds accounts, the trends are similar to those of 
house prices. Between 2000 and 2006, the ratio of mortgage 
debt to disposable income in the U.S. increased by roughly 
50 percent, jumping from two-thirds to over 100 percent. 
In Canada, the increase was roughly half as large, with the 
debt-income ratio moving from 70 to 90 percent. 
The potential risks of increased household mortgage debt 
depend critically upon its distribution across borrowers. 
To see how the distribution of mortgage debt has changed 
we examine the distribution of the ratio of the outstanding 
loan to house value (the LTV) of borrowers. A high LTV 
implies that a small decline in the house price would leave 
the owner with negative equity. Negative equity is problem-
atic as it removes the option for a homeowner who is unable 
to meet their mortgage payments to sell their home to repay 
the mortgage.
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3.  Mortgage Delinquency Rates (90+ days delinquent)
Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association. National Delinquency Survey.
Notes: The delinquency rate is the number of mortgages past due as a 
percent of the total number of mortgages at the end of the period. The 
delinquency rate does not include loans in the process of foreclosure.
As ﬁ  gure 2 illustrates, Canada has signiﬁ  cantly fewer 
households with LTV ratios above 80 percent than the 
U.S. Before the housing bust, roughly 21 percent of Ameri-
can households with mortgages had LTV ratios above 80 
percent, versus 15 percent of Canadian households. Restrict-
ing attention to households with LTV above 90 percent the 
comparison is even more striking: roughly 12 percent in the 
U.S. versus just over 6 percent in Canada. 
A surprising fact about these LTV ratios is how little the 
distribution of U.S. mortgages by loan-to-value changed 
during the housing boom. This is surprising given that the 
rapid house price appreciation acted to lower the LTV ratios 
of existing mortgages. Working in the opposite direction 
were two forces. First, some households undid the effect of 
higher house prices by extracting equity. Second, the rise in 
subprime and Alt-A mortgage originations from roughly 1.4 
million in 2003 to 3 million in 2005 was accompanied by 
an increase in the median LTV of new subprime mortgages 
from 90 percent to 100 percent (as documented in Mayer, 
Pence, and Sherlund, 2009). 
While broadly similar trends were occurring in house prices 
and mortgage debt in the U.S. and Canada, very different 
patterns of mortgage delinquencies and defaults were emerg-
ing. The best available comparison is for delinquencies on 
prime mortgages (which account for the bulk of mortgage 
credit) in the two countries (ﬁ  gure 3). Prior to 2006, de-
linquencies were comparable in both countries (and were 
slightly higher in Canada). While delinquencies increased 
more than four-fold in the U.S. after 2007, as of mid 2009 
there has been little sign of an increase in mortgage delin-
quencies in Canada. A similar story holds in the subprime 
market. Researchers Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund reported 
that 8 percent of the U.S. subprime mortgages originated 
in 2007 had defaulted after 12 months, as opposed to 1.5 
percent over 2000–2004. The available Canadian data also 
features an increase in subprime mortgage delinquencies, 
but the delinquency rate in 2007 was still under 2 percent, 
according to the Financial System Review in June 2008.
These different patterns in delinquencies occurred during a 
period of similar macroeconomic performance. Unemploy-
ment rates were stable throughout 2007 and early 2008, at 
roughly 5 percent in the U.S. and 6 percent in Canada. The 
timing of the recent deterioration in labor markets has also 
been similar, with unemployment rates rising to 9.4 percent 
(U.S.) and 8.6 percent (Canada) by July 2009. What these 
data reveal is that mortgage delinquencies began to increase 
in the United States before the rise in unemployment, but in 
Canada they remained low and only began to increase after 
the rise in unemployment in 2008. That difference is a key 
clue to determining what caused the housing bust.
Monetary Policy and the U.S. Housing Bust
The low interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve over 
2001–2005 is often cited as a key factor in the U.S. hous-
ing bust. The main narrative is that by lowering short-term 
interest rates, the Federal Reserve pushed down (longer-
maturity) mortgage interest rates. This policy increased 
United States Canada
LTV ratios 1999 2005 2007 2006
0–80 76.48 79.14 78.12 84.79
80–90 10.55 8.98 9.66 8.81
90–100 7.56 6.37 6.93 1.53
100+  5.41 5.51 5.28 4.87
Sources: Bank of Canada Financial System Review December 2007; 
American Housing Survey. The American Housing Survey reports 
the ratio of all outstanding mortgages (excluding home equity lines 
of credit) to the value of the house.
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Sources: S&P/Case-Shiller (20-city) for U.S. house prices and Teranet 
(6-city) for Canadian.
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4. Central Bank Target Rates
demand for housing, leading to upward pressure on housing 
prices, which encouraged builders to ramp up construction 
of new homes. This led to an “oversupply” of new homes, 
which triggered the housing bust. 
The claim that interest rates were too low over 2001–2005 
is motivated by a couple of observations. First, the fed-
eral funds rate was low by historical standards: declining 
from over 6 percent in early 2001 to 1 percent in 2003 and 
remaining low until 2005 (see ﬁ  gure 4). Second, interest 
rates over this period were much lower than those predicted 
by the Taylor rule for monetary policy (which relates the 
Federal Reserve target rate to inﬂ  ation and GDP) over 2002 
to 2006. 
The Bank of Canada also made dramatic reductions in its 
target interest rate over 2001–2002. One might argue that 
Canadian monetary policy was not quite as “loose” as that 
in the U.S. as it maintained a higher overnight rate over 
2002 to 2004. But a case can be made that Canadian and 
American monetary policy were very similar, at least in 
terms of the housing market. Ahrend, Cournede and Price 
(2008) estimate deviations from the Taylor rule for Canada 
and the U.S. over 2001–2006 and ﬁ  nd that the cumulative 
deviations were nearly identical. 
In addition, mortgage interest rates—the main direct channel 
through which monetary policy impacts the housing mar-
ket—tracked each other closely in the two countries. Unlike 
the U.S., where the mainstay of the mortgage market is the 
30-year ﬁ  xed mortgage, the most common mortgage product 
in Canada is a ﬁ  ve-year ﬁ  xed rate mortgage (with a 25-year 
amortization period). As ﬁ  gure 5 illustrates, the two bench-
mark mortgage interest rates move closely with one another 
until after the beginning of the U.S. housing market crisis, 
when U.S. rates fall signiﬁ  cantly below Canadian rates. 
The similarity of the impact of monetary policy and the ab-
sence of a housing market bust in Canada suggest that some 
other factor must have been present in the U.S. to gener-
ate the boom and bust. This is not to suggest that “loose” 
monetary policy did not put upward pressure on housing 
prices—indeed, both Canada and the U.S. experienced 
substantial levels of house price appreciation. However, the 
Canada-U.S comparison suggests that some other factor 
drove both the more rapid house appreciation and set the 
groundwork for a U.S. housing bust. 
Relaxed Lending Standards: 
Different Subprime Lending Booms 
The other leading explanation of the housing boom and 
bust relies critically on relaxed lending standards. This story 
is linked to the dramatic rise in subprime lending and high 
levels of loan securitization, which some commentators have 
argued reduced the incentives for mortgage originators to 
maintain underwriting standards. This is one area where 
there was a signiﬁ  cant difference between the two countries, 
both in the size and nature of the subprime market and in 
the fraction of mortgages securitized. 
5. Benchmark Mortgage Interest Rates




























The subprime markets in the U.S. and Canada include house-
holds with tarnished credit histories as well as borrowers with 
difﬁ  cult-to-document income sources. Subprime lending has 
grown rapidly in both countries, though the magnitude has 
been far more striking in the U.S. While subprime mortgages 
accounted for less than 5 percent of mortgage originations in 
the U.S. in 1994, a ﬁ  fth of all mortgages originated between 
2004–2006 were subprime, according to data reported by 
James Barth in 2009. 
But while subprime lending also increased in Canada, the 
subprime market remains much smaller than in the U.S. The 
most cited estimate is that subprime lenders had a market 
share of roughly 5 percent in 2006—compared to 22 percent in 
the U.S. (Mortgage Architects, 2007). Moreover, the Canadian 
subprime market never expanded signiﬁ  cantly into newer 
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mortgages, whose popularity grew rapidly in the U.S. from 
2003 to 2006. Instead, the Canadian subprime market 
mainly offered products popularized in the U.S. during the 
1990s, such as longer amortization periods for loans (from 
25 to 40 years), and mainly targeted near-prime borrowers. 
Securitization has also been less common in Canada than 
in the United States, with roughly 25 percent of Canadian 
mortgages securitized in 2007 versus nearly 60 percent in 
the U.S. The Canadian securitization market has grown rap-
idly over the past decade, rising from roughly 5 percent of 
mortgages in 1998 to over 25 percent in 2008. However, in 
many ways, the Canadian market resembles the early stages 
of the U.S. mortgage securitization market, as most securi-
tized mortgages in Canada are backed by an explicit govern-
ment guarantee. This government guarantee requires limits 
on borrowers’ debt-service ratios and amortization periods, 
which makes it more difﬁ  cult for lenders to offer some types 
of subprime loans. 
The different magnitude of the subprime lending boom 
in the two countries is consistent with differences outlined 
above between the Canadian and U.S. housing markets 
over the past 10 years. The rapid growth of the subprime 
market provided an additional boost to demand in the U.S. 
that is consistent with the more rapid house price apprecia-
tion in the U.S. than in Canada. 
The subprime story is also consistent with the different pat-
tern of mortgage delinquencies in Canada and the U.S. In the 
U.S., mortgage delinquencies for both prime and nonprime 
mortgages began to rise before the recession began and un-
employment rates began to climb. In contrast, mortgage de-
linquencies in Canada have only recently begun to increase—
after unemployment rates started rising and the Canadian 
and world economies slowed sharply in the fall of 2008. 
Finally, the relaxed lending story is consistent with the fact 
that the U.S. experienced a housing bust over 2007–2009 
while Canada did not. While the expansion of subprime 
lending provided a temporary boost to housing price growth 
rates, when prices stopped rising, the inability of some bor-
rowers to reﬁ  nance homes they could not afford led to a 
spike of delinquencies. The resulting increase in liquidation 
and foreclosure sales put additional downward pressure on 
house prices, which in turn pushed more borrowers into 
default. This “negative feedback” cycle helped push a cor-
rection in the housing market into a housing bust. 
One possible critique of this argument is that while Canada 
has not yet experienced a housing bust, it is likely to experi-
ence one in the next year. Indeed, a recent Merrill-Lynch-
Canada report noted that Canadian house prices over 
the past decade closely resemble U.S. house prices with a 
two-year lag (see ﬁ  gure 1). Based on this, they concluded 
that Canada was also likely to experience a large decline in 
house prices over the coming year. Canada’s smaller sub-
prime market share and fewer households with high LTV 
ratios, however, suggest that the country is less likely to see 
the rapid increase in defaults that helped trigger the bust in 
U.S. housing prices. So far the incoming data suggest that 
the Canadian housing market is likely to experience a hous-
ing market slowdown rather than a bust.
Why Was the Subprime Market in Canada Smaller?
Given the key role played by the “subprime” market, the 
question is why the Canadian subprime market was both 
smaller and levels of securitization were lower than in the 
U.S. While it is difﬁ  cult to disentangle the reasons why 
Canada avoided the subprime boom, some factors can be 
identiﬁ  ed that may have contributed to the differences in the 
Canadian and U.S. subprime markets. 
Perhaps the simplest story is that Canada was “lucky” to 
be a late adopter of U.S. innovations rather than an innova-
tor in mortgage ﬁ  nance. While the subprime share of the 
Canadian market was small, it was growing rapidly prior to 
the onset of the U.S. subprime crisis. In response to the U.S. 
crisis, some subprime lenders exited the Canadian market 
due to difﬁ  culties in securing funding. In addition, the Cana-
dian government moved in July 2008 to tighten the stan-
dards for mortgage insurance required for high LTV loans 
originated by federally regulated ﬁ  nancial institutions. This 
further limited the ability of Canadian banks to directly of-
fer subprime-type products to borrowers. 
There are also several institutional details that played a role. 
The Canadian market lacks a counterpart to Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae, both of which played a signiﬁ  cant role in 
the growth of securitization in the U.S. In addition, bank 
capital regulation in Canada treats off-balance sheet ve-
hicles more strictly than the U.S., and the stricter treatment 
reduces the incentive for Canadian banks to move mortgage 
loans to off-balance sheet vehicles. Finally, as noted above, 
the fact that the government-mandated mortgage insurance 
for high LTV loans issued by Canadian banks effectively 
made it impossible for banks to offer certain subprime prod-
ucts. This likely slowed the growth of the subprime market 
in Canada, as nonbank intermediaries had to organically 
grow origination networks.
A Challenge for Policymakers 
The Canada-U.S. comparison suggests the low interest rate 
policy of the central banks in both countries contributed to 
the housing boom over 2001–2006 and that a relaxation of 
lending standards in the U.S. was the critical factor in set-
ting the stage for the housing bust. A caveat worth empha-
sizing, however, is that the Canada-U.S. comparison tells 
us little about what would have happened if U.S. monetary 
policy had been tighter earlier. Tighter monetary policy in 
the early part of the decade may have helped to limit the 
subprime boom by slowing the rate of house price apprecia-
tion over 2002–2006. The Canada-U.S. comparison does, 
however, highlight the practical challenge facing policymak-
ers in assessing whether a rapid run-up in asset prices is a 
bubble or a “sustainable” movement in market prices.
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